Ankara describes defense pact as NATO-like mutual defense obligation

Fidan described the agreement as a security arrangement whose mutual defense commitment is similar to that of the North Atlantic Treaty. He also pointed out that the Sunni-led states of the region needed to draw closer together in order to be able to respond to regional threats. The pact is intended to fill a gap that Ankara has considered insufficiently closed since the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 – although this historical reference remains contested.

Observers interpret the agreement as a signal to regional rivals. The cooperation between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is aimed, among other things, at strengthening deterrence in the Gulf and in Southwest Asia. Egypt, which has been traded as a possible partner in several rounds, is not yet part of the pact.

Signals to the Region

Turkey emphasizes that the pact is not directed against any third state. At the same time, Western diplomats see an additional security-policy center of gravity beyond NATO in the new structure. This reading is reinforced by the fact that the three signatory states have repeatedly proposed their own security initiatives in the past without involving the Alliance.

Within Turkey, the agreement is supported by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had described the pact as a contribution to a "multipolar security order." Opposition politicians, on the other hand, criticized that a parallel structure to NATO could weaken existing alliances and push Turkey between the blocs.

Pragmatically speaking, the agreement supplements existing bilateral agreements between Ankara and Riyadh as well as between Ankara and Islamabad. For the first time, it brings the three countries together in a single framework and provides for regular consultations at the level of foreign and defense ministers.

Mutual Defense Obligation with Thresholds

The modalities of the mutual defense obligation resemble NATO Article 5, but with modules instead of a uniform threshold. Intelligence assistance can already be activated at a lower threat level, while the deployment of combat troops is tied to stricter political and parliamentary requirements. Fidan spoke of a "flexible threshold" that would be adapted to the respective situation.

Should a member state actually request military support, the national parliaments of the other two states would have to consent. This distinguishes the pact from an automatic mutual defense obligation such as that known to NATO. The Turkish foreign minister acknowledged that the "application hurdles" could vary depending on the political constellation.

Outside analysts point out that the effectiveness of the pact will depend on whether the armed forces of the three countries are interoperable and whether joint exercises take place. So far there are only declarations of intent, but no concrete plans for maneuvers or a permanent command structure. The question of leadership – Ankara, Riyadh or Islamabad – is also open.

Open Questions on Interoperability

The reaction from the European capitals and Washington was restrained. No one commented officially on the agreement, but behind the scenes it was emphasized that the development was being closely monitored. The concern: A Sunni-led parallel structure could exacerbate tensions in areas of tension such as the Middle East rather than defuse them.

For Turkey, the pact is also an instrument of foreign policy profiling. Ankara has been trying for years to position itself as a security actor between Europe, the Gulf and Central Asia. With the "Mecca Defense Pact," this claim takes on an institutional form – with all the opportunities, but also the risks, that such a reorganization brings with it.