Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan: New Alliance Against Non-State Actors

Political observers see the agreement as an attempt by the three countries to deepen their security policy cooperation in a region characterized by tensions between Sunni and Shia actors, proxy conflicts and the rivalry of regional powers. At the same time, the trio is sending a signal to Tehran that its own security interests are to be pursued in a coordinated manner in the future.

Geography as a Challenge

Geographically, the alliance lacks a connecting element: Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan share no common borders. This finding, which is corroborated threefold in the available sources, underlines that this is a political-strategic agreement whose implementation must manage without direct territorial contiguity. Practical cooperation is likely to be organized via sea routes, air corridors and bilateral bases.

Turkey, as a NATO member, brings to the alliance a Western alliance membership that neither Saudi Arabia nor Pakistan possess. Ankara could thus serve as a bridge between the Gulf region and the Western defense alliance. Pakistan, in turn, has a large conventional military force and nuclear weapons, giving the trio additional weight. Riyadh contributes significant financial resources and diplomatic influence in the Arab world.

Tehran Looks Skeptically Toward Riyadh

From Tehran's perspective, however, the agreement is charged with tensions. Iran sees itself surrounded in the region by a growing number of Sunni-led states that are deepening their cooperation. Jaspal's clarification that the alliance is not directed against Iran is likely to find only partial resonance in Tehran, since the non-state actors mentioned – the Houthis and Shia militias in Iraq – belong, from Iran's perspective, to its own sphere of influence.

Another aspect is the question of the agreement's scope. Open details on concrete military exercises, joint intelligence cooperation or armaments projects were not named in the available sources. The operative core of the agreement thus remains blurred for the time being, even if its political symbolic effect is clear.

Western Reactions Still Pending

International reactions to the new trio are still pending. Observers will pay particular attention to statements from Washington, Tehran and Brussels, since Turkey, as a NATO member, bears a special responsibility toward its Western partners. Should the alliance serve as a platform for joint arms procurement, Israel's reaction would also be of significance, as it pursues its own security doctrine in the region.

In domestic political terms, the agreement is likely to be received differently in all three countries. In Pakistan, which is under economic pressure and dependent on foreign investment, the cooperation could be chalked up as a foreign policy success for the government. In Turkey, the project is likely to be welcomed across party lines, while in Saudi Arabia it is part of Riyadh's broader regional reorientation under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

The agreement fits into a series of successive rapprochements in the region. Following the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the spring of 2023, as well as Turkey's entry into the normalization with Egypt, the latest steps show that the classic bloc boundaries in the region are becoming more porous. The trio of Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad is now setting another accent in this development.

Jaspal stressed that the agreement should not be overinterpreted. Its thrust against non-state actors is compatible with existing United Nations resolutions. Whether, however, the alliance will become operationally capable of action beyond declarations of intent, the coming months will show.

Economic Dimension Conceivable

What is certain is that, with the agreement, the three states have created an institutional framework for regular consultations. In the future, this framework could also encompass economic and energy policy issues, such as cooperation on liquefied natural gas, renewable energies and cross-border infrastructure.

The coming weeks will show whether the alliance will have an effect beyond symbolic politics. According to information from the capitals involved, regular meetings at the level of foreign ministers and general staffs are planned. A first summit meeting is expected as early as this quarter.

Observers in Islamabad also see in the agreement a response to the growing security policy complexity in South and West Asia. The threat posed by non-state actors, from the Houthi militia to various militias in Iraq, has intensified over the past years and requires coordinated responses from cross-regional partners.